Policy Analysis of Sea Defence Strategy in the Archipelago’s Capital Region

Deni Purwanto¹, Agus Subianto², Budi Rianto³  

^1,2,3 Master of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Hang Tuah Surabaya, Indonesia

ABSTRACT: The Nusantara Sea Defence Strategy (SPLN) is essentially a national defence strategy implemented at sea. The implementation of SPLN is carried out through a military campaign through interrelated joint operations, matra operations and assistance operations with the support of national forces. This research, which uses qualitative research methods, takes place in the Archipelago Capital Region (IKN). In the Marine Defence Strategy Policy in the Archipelago Capital Region (IKN), the problem formulation is the need for a defence system policy that can protect the Archipelago Capital (IKN) from various physical and non-physical threats. Given the location of IKN in the strategic Indonesian Archipelago Sea Route II (ALKI II) as a connecting route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it has a number of problems that have the potential to become threats. The results of this study indicate that there are several aspects in the analysis of the Marine Defence Strategy Policy in the Archipelago Capital Region (IKN) according to William Dunn, which consists of aspects of Problem Formulation, Forecasting, Policy Recommendations, Monitoring Policy Results and Policy Performance Evaluation. In the forecasting aspect based on Indonesia’s historical experience.

Policy recommendations in this study are the relocation of the new capital city from Jakarta to East Kalimantan, changing the geographical character of the Indonesian capital city so far. The development of IKN necessitates the need for transformation of the TNI’s power level because the centre of gravity of government has shifted from Java to Kalimantan. Therefore, a new breakthrough is needed from all stakeholders to formulate a mature and integrated strategic planning for the development of the country’s maritime defence that collaborates all potential defence capabilities of the State, namely between the TNI (Army, Navy and Air Force), ministries, as well as with other government agencies, and still adhere to the principles of transparency and accountability.

KEYWORDS: Analysis, Policy, Strategy, Sea Defence, Capital of the Archipelago

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is an archipelago that has abundant potential for marine natural resources, with a coastline that reaches 99,093 km. However, this potential can be a threat, especially in areas directly bordering several neighbouring countries. Moreover, the existence of Indonesia with a favourable geographical position can be a strength of opportunity as well as a weakness of threat for the sustainability of this nation.

Dahuri (2014) stated that Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world with more than 17,000 islands with a coastline length of approximately 81,000 km and a water  area of 3.1 million km2 consisting of 0.3 km2 of territorial waters and 2.8 million km2 of archipelagic waters. Thus it can be said that of Indonesia’s territorial area, 62% is water area. This has the consequence of potential military and non-military threats that use sea and coastal areas as an alternative palagan. Therefore, President Joko Widodo’s policy to make Indonesia the ‘World Maritime Axis (PMD)’ is a desire for a paradigm shift towards the importance of maritime insight for all Indonesian people.

According to Limbong (2015) that ‘Awareness of the shift in the development paradigm should be realised in the form of policy support that is comprehensive and concrete, systematic, not partial or sporadic’. Law (UU) Number 6 of 1996 which describes the regulation of Indonesian waters, namely territorial sea waters, archipelagic waters, and inland waters. Indonesia’s territorial sea is a 12 nautical mile wide sea lane measured from the base line of the Indonesian archipelago, and in Government Regulation (PP) Number 37 of 2002 it is also explained about ‘The rights and obligations of foreign ships and aircraft in carrying out cross-sea archipelagic matters through the archipelagic sea lane that is determined’. In addition to legal products related to Indonesian territorial waters, the PP also explains the division of three areas of the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Route (ALKI) which is an alternative sea crossing route for ships of other countries.

In addition, Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 16/2017 on Indonesia’s Maritime Policy mentions five water areas as choke points, namely the Malacca Strait, Lombok Strait, Wetar Strait, Sunda Strait and Ombai Strait. Choke points are strategic areas that have the potential not only to become sea traffic routes, but also the possibility of illegal exploration of marine resources. Geographically, the five choke points are open access areas that are vulnerable to transnational crimes.

According to Sarundajang (2011), the consequences of open access areas affect the behaviour of the state and government in setting its policies. In addition, the concept of geography, geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geostrategy of a country is also strongly influenced by variables such as trade routes, natural resource centres, and national boundaries. In line with this, Priyono & Yusgiantoro (2017) said that the concept of awareness of the use of a space is reflected in the form of sovereignty claims, the establishment of land and sea boundaries of a country which can sometimes trigger prolonged border disputes.

Transnational crimes that use sea and coastal areas include illicit drugs, arms smuggling, illegal logging, human trafficking, illegal migrants, and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Fishing). These crimes do not only involve state actors, but are currently dominated by non-state actors using the sophistication of information and electronic technology. To anticipate and face these threats, a strong maritime defence is needed through the governance of marine and coastal areas.

After the enactment of Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning the State Capital named Nusantara and hereinafter referred to as the Capital of the Archipelago (IKN) on 15 February 2022, Article 6 Paragraph (2) mentions the scope of the IKN area located in the North Penajam Paser district of East Kalimantan Province, of course making Penajam the centre of state government and the area where the state capital is located as the center of gravity of Indonesia which has been in Jakarta.

This means that the concept of national defence development must really be a concern and careful planning of both physical and non-physical development, because the defence situation of the national capital greatly determines the smooth running of the government based in the national capital. One aspect that needs to be highlighted is the defence and security aspects of the new National Capital. Given the strategic location of IKN, it cannot be separated from defence threats and security disturbances, both carried out by state actors, non-state actors, and hybrids.

IKN’s position is directly adjacent to the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Route (ALKI) II and the world’s choke point. While on the air side, the location of IKN is close to the Flight Information Region (FIR) of neighbouring countries, such as Singapore, Kinabalu Malaysia, and Manila Philippines. In addition, the new capital city is within the cruising radius of ICBM (inter continental ballistic missile) and hypersonic missiles of certain countries. Another threat is that the island of Kalimantan is currently the location and route of trans-nation crime, such as smuggling people, drugs, and so on. IKN is also close to the terrorist transit triangle in Sulu, Sabah and Poso. Then, the position of the new capital city is surrounded by defence alliances, such as Malaysia’s FPDA (The Five Power Defence Arrangements) and so on, then the AUKUS Alliance of Australia, UK, and USA, and is affected by One Belt One Road (OBOR) or Belt Road Initiative (BRI China). There needs to be preparedness and anticipation from all elements involved, including the government, experts, and the media, which play an important role in building public perceptions and awareness of potential threats faced according to the characteristics of the region. This is because the community is an actor who plays an important role in national defence and security or what we know better as the universal people’s defence system.

Law Number 3 Year 2002 as an Operational Foundation is held by the government and prepared early with a state defence system through efforts to build and foster the ability and deterrence of the state and nation in overcoming any threat. The national defence system in facing military threats places the TNI as the main component supported by reserve and supporting components. Meanwhile, in facing non-military threats, placing government agencies outside the defence sector as the main element adapted to the form and nature of the threat supported by other elements of the nation’s power.

State defence is an effort to defend the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the nation from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and state. The definition is contained in Article 1 point 1 of Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defence (State Defence Law). State defence has an urgency in maintaining the existence of the nation and state both from territorial control, sovereignty, and safety. This includes the capital city, which is the centre of government and a symbol of the state. As a symbol of the state, it is of course the state’s obligation to maintain the defence and security of the country from various aspects of sea, air, land and also strengthen cooperation with other countries, especially in the area around the capital city.

The national defence strategy is prepared to deal with all threats to national defence both military and non-military in nature as mandated in article 7 of Law No. 3 of 2002 concerning National Defence, ‘one of the basic principles of the preparation of national defence is to pay attention to the geographical conditions of Indonesia as an archipelago’. In the maritime sector, the defence strategy implemented is the Nusantara Sea Defence Strategy (SPLN) which is essentially a state defence strategy implemented at sea. The implementation of SPLN is carried out through a military campaign through interrelated joint operations, matra operations and assistance operations with the support of national forces. SPLN is structured based on the concept of archipelago defence strategy with reference to the development of the strategic environment and the ability of available national resources, held to deal with various situations and conditions both in peacetime and in times of war by mobilising national forces.

To achieve this goal, the archipelago sea defence strategy is formulated, which includes: First, the Deterrence Strategy, directed at preventing the intentions of those who interfere with the sovereignty of the state and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as those that harm national interests through naval diplomacy, presence at sea, especially in border areas that have the potential to become sources of conflict in the future, and building the capabilities and strength of the Navy.

Second, the Layered Defence Strategy, directed at eliminating and destroying external threats through the title of joint sea and air forces in the buffer defence field (layer 1), the main defence field (layer 2) and the resistance area (layer 3), by involving the strength of the Navy together with all maritime components and supported by the strength of the Navy. The layered defence strategy is applied during wartime in the form of sea combat operations that have a forward defence nature while still paying attention to the concept of shifting the battlefield.

Third, the Sea Control Strategy, is directed at ensuring the use of the sea for its own strength and preventing the use of the sea by opponents, breaking the opponent’s sea lines and preventing the elimination of various threats from domestic sea aspects through the title of strength in the form of daily sea operations and sea combat alert operations supported by the strength of the Navy in selective vulnerable waters.

The archipelago’s defence is comprehensively dualistic, namely outward-looking and inward-looking. Outward-looking defence means that archipelago defence embraces the concept of forward-looking defence so as not to provide opportunities for the enemy to enter the national jurisdiction. While looking inward, it means that the archipelago’s defence is able to overcome every form of threat from within the country that has merged with threats from abroad. (kompasiana.com accessed on 8 November 2023). Based on the background of the problems described above, the author is interested in conducting a research entitled Analysis of Sea Defence Policy Strategy in the Archipelago Capital Region (IKN).

RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses qualitative research methods. Creswell (2014) in his book entitled ‘Qualitative Inquiry And Research Design’ reveals that qualitative research can be defined as a process for understanding social problems or human problems based on a holistic picture, reporting informants’ views in detail and scientifically structured. By using this research method, researchers describe and interpret the actual facts in the field. By using a qualitative descriptive approach, the purpose of this research is to analyse the Strategy of Marine Defence Policy in the Archipelago Capital Region (IKN).

The qualitative analysis method uses 4 interactive models, namely data collection, data condensation, data presentation and conclusion drawing (Miles and Huberman 2014). The interactive model in question is as follows: 1).             Data Collection, Data collection is data collected in the form of words and not in the form of a series of words. The data collection process is carried out by interview, observation and documentation of the parties related to the Marine Defence Policy Strategy in the Archipelago Capital Region. 2). Data condensation (Data Condentation), Data condensation looks at the process of selecting, simplifying, processing, and or changing data that approaches the entire section of written field notes, interview texts, and other empirical material. 3). Data presentation (Data display), in qualitative research, data presentation can be held in the form of brief explanations, frames, relationships between categories and the like. 4). Conclution, drawing/verifying, the last way in qualitative data analysis is drawing conclusions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Based on the results of field findings using interviews, some observations and documentation, the findings are obtained in the form of narratives and supported by the existence of documentation in the form of pictures / photos and related documents to reinforce the meaning and validity of the data obtained.

1. Sea Defence Challenges of the Archipelago’s Capital City
2. Security Dynamics of the Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region is a strategic region, both in economic, political and military aspects. It contains countries with more than one billion people (India and China), modern military technology, large military human resources, which influence the global economy and politics.

From a traditional security perspective, the Asia-Pacific region has very complex opportunities and challenges, as well as risk factors that can lead to interstate conflict. Disputes in the South China Sea, East China Sea, Korean Peninsula, and tensions in some border areas between countries are things that need to be addressed wisely. From a non-traditional security perspective, the region has a long history of narcotics smuggling, human smuggling, arms smuggling, maritime piracy, theft of natural resources and separatism. In addition, in the last three decades, the issue of terrorism has become stronger due to various factors, including economic problems and radicalism.

The dynamic development of the Asia Pacific region has an impact on economic and security issues. Developments that need to be watched and affect security stability are China’s economic and military policies, the United States (US) strategic policy in the region, and disputes in the South China Sea. China’s high economic growth has enabled the country to modernise its military. This has led to speculation and mixed responses from countries in the region and concerns over military balance, thus, posing a security dilemma for countries in the region.

The US rebalancing policy in the Asia Pacific region is pursued through three initiatives: security through the presence of military forces, economy through the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) to balance the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and diplomatic engagement. The South China Sea dispute, which involves several countries, can affect security stability in the Asia Pacific region. This region has a very strategic geographical position, and the potential for natural resources with high economic value. The geographical position is an international shipping and communication route, while the potential for natural resources has the opportunity to be explored.

The South China Sea dispute has the potential to become an armed (open) conflict for three reasons. First, the parties involved in the South China Sea disputes often use military instruments to strengthen their claims. Second, there is the involvement of countries outside the region in the conflict. Third, there is no credible international institution or organisation to resolve the dispute. On the other hand, armed conflicts do not occur because ASEAN countries are committed to resolving conflicts not through armed violence, but through dialogue and brotherhood based on mutual understanding, respect and trust.

1. Modernisation of Military Power

Several countries in the Asia Pacific region have modernised their defence forces, supported by better economic growth. The aim is not only to be equal and achieve standardisation with alliance systems, but also to anticipate contingencies due to the uncertainty of the strategic situation. Modernisation of weapon systems and provocative deployments can lead to miscalculations and misperceptions. Misjudgement/perception of events can create complex and dangerous situations, especially in light of potential ongoing conflicts in the region, such as in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

The modernisation of military forces is also influenced by advances in defence technology. Several countries in the region have utilised the technology to modernise strategic conventional weapons systems as well as modern integrated sensing systems such as Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Observation and Reconnaissance (K4IPP), and cyber defence systems. Specifically about cyber, today cyber warfare has become a strategy to inflict losses that have a strategic impact on a country.

1. State Border Issues

The Asia Pacific region still has potential border disputes that have not been fully resolved. Empirical facts show that one of the main causes of war is border issues. Ongoing conflicts and crises in this context can increase the occurrence of traditional threats if dispute management is not carried out properly.

Indonesia as an archipelago that is very open from various directions, Indonesia has a number of unresolved border issues. In addition, Indonesia has 92 outermost/frontier small islands, of which 12 outermost small islands require priority in management so that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia can be optimally guaranteed. This condition has the potential to cause violations of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, especially in the land border areas of countries that have not yet obtained a mutual agreement and the outermost / foremost small islands that have not been properly managed. Violations of state sovereignty in air and sea territory, such as foreign flights/voyages, cause tension, and can even lead to conflict.

1. Transnational Crime

Transnational crime is currently seen as one of the threats to global security. In the Southeast Asia region, this crime is a serious threat and poses a vulnerability to security stability. In accordance with the implementation program of the ASEAN action plan to combat transnational crime (Program to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime) which states that in this region there are several types of transnational crimes such as: drug trafficking, human trafficking, sea piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, terrorism, international banking crimes and cyber crimes.

Transnational crimes that are a common and serious threat include drug crimes that can be related to funding sources for terrorist and separatist groups. The development of this transnational crime has grown massively from within a region and hardline groups or organized criminals. This crime phenomenon has a major impact on security stability and has the potential to disrupt and threaten national development, so Indonesia is always consistent in its efforts to enforce the law and protect citizens from the chain of transnational crimes. The National Capital (IKN) as the center of gravity of the country, has an important and fundamental role that greatly determines the existence of the country. Therefore, the defense system must be designed in a comprehensive, holistic and integral manner.

Based on Presidential Regulation Number 63 of 2022 concerning the Details of the Main Capital City of the Archipelago, a number of things are emphasized. First, the system and strategy as a whole are universal in nature involving all citizens, regions, and national resources, as well as organizing the development of a national defense posture, development of a national defense system, and institutional development. Second, the defense of the IKN is carried out with a layered defense system and strategy that is carried out with smart defense, namely the synergy between hard defense in the form of military defense and soft defense in the form of non-military defense. According to the Coordinator of the Implementation of Defense and Security Policy at BRIN, Gerald Theodorus L. Toruan, the IKN is the Center of Gravity (COG), namely a new source of economy, center of government, and center of defense strength. However, Theo highlighted the vulnerability of the IKN as a COG. Therefore, it is necessary to implement a Smart Defense system in the IKN Maritime Defense System. Smart defense, explained Gerald Theodorus L. Toruan, is a national defense system that synergizes military and non-military defense. This concept prioritizes diplomacy and combines technological developments, through the utilization of the national defense industry.

This is in line with the concept of the IKN smart city which utilizes advances in information and communication technology efficiently, innovatively, inclusively, and resiliently. The IKN airspace, he continued, is within the radius of three United States military capabilities, strategic bombers, fighter jets, and cruise missiles. On the other hand, the IKN area is also within the radius of Chinese ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and bombers. Presidential Regulation Number 63 of 2022 concerning the IKN Master Plan mandates that a layered defense system and strategy be pursued with smart defense. Namely, synergy between hard defense and soft defense. Then synergized with total diplomacy as a manifestation of a dual defense system strategy. Gerald Theodorus L. Toruan explained that the concept of smart defense was first introduced by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to promote defense cooperation between alliance members. The goal is to create a common understanding in building efficient and effective defense capabilities.

However, according to Gerald Theodorus L. Toruan, the NATO version of the smart defense concept is not relevant to be applied in Indonesia. Because, Indonesia has a foreign policy that is free and active, not taking sides and allied with one of the countries in the world. He assessed that the concept in this Presidential Decree is actually the same as the universal people’s defense system (Sishankamrata) that already exists in Indonesia. Sishankamrata is a holistic approach that involves all components of the nation in order to maintain and defend the sovereignty of the state.

2. Indonesian Defense System Before the Relocation of the National Capital

National defense is an action to eliminate all threats from foreign enemies, in any form or form, that threaten and endanger the sovereignty, safety, and existence of the nation and state. According to Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense, it states that the National Defense System is a universal defense system that involves all citizens, territories, and other national resources, and is prepared early by the government and organized in a total, integrated, directed, and continuous manner to uphold the sovereignty of the State, territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire nation from all threats. National Defense is not solely intended for war, but also to realize peace, guarantee the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, secure national interests, and ensure the implementation of national development. National defense is also one of the main elements of a country because it concerns the interests of protecting citizens, territories, and its political system from threats from other countries. This is in line with the opinion of KJ Holsti where defense is a national interest that is considered a core value or something that is considered most vital for the country and concerns the existence of a country

Universal defense system is an improvement of the previous system, namely Sishankamrata (Universal People’s Defense and Security System). The universal defense system was born from the political conditions after the 1998 reformation. Universality contains the meaning of the involvement of all people and all national resources, national facilities and infrastructure, and 18 all regions of the State as a whole and comprehensive defense unit. Defense strategy is one of the important things to discuss when it comes to the defense system. Defense strategy focuses on the core of defense. In facing threats to national resilience, the TNI (Indonesian National Army) as the main component of state defense has policies in the form of deterrence strategies, action strategies, and recovery strategies that are prepared to face various forms of threats, both military threats and non-military threats.

The national defense capability developed to realize a universal Defense System integrates military and non-military defense capabilities. The national defense capability is compiled based on the National Defense Strategy which reflects the capabilities, strengths, and titles of national defense forces and resources. In order to implement the National Defense Strategy, the national defense capability is developed to achieve the standard of deterrence, namely the national defense capability that is able to deter and overcome the threat of aggression against the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and the safety of the nation. Within this scope, the national defense capability is developed to face the worst conditions in the form of war. If the national defense capability is built with conventional standards to be able to defend itself from aggression, then other defense tasks can certainly be carried out. Defense capability can be indicated by the material resources owned by a country that can be transformed into military strength. The three main things that are tools for analyzing a country’s defense capability are termed the 3M Paradigm (Manpower, Machine and Money). This section analyzes the defense capability owned by Indonesia by looking at the main elements of the defense capability.

1. Manpower

Manpower is one of the main elements for measuring a country’s defense capability. Specifically, the important thing to look at is the size of the armed forces. The Indonesian armed forces are organized into three main components, namely the Indonesian National Army (TNI), which consists of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The TNI’s duties include military operations for war, and military operations in peacetime.

2. Machine

The machine referred to as the main element for measuring defense capability is military equipment or main weapons system (alutsista). Judging from the number and type of defense technology systems owned by the Indonesian National Army (TNI), both the Army (AD), Navy, and Air Force (AU), its current operational capabilities are still far from adequate when compared to neighboring countries in the Southeast Asia region. In number, the Army, Navy and Air Force only have defense equipment, especially Alutsista, with very limited numbers and their functions are less than optimal because they are not in accordance with technological developments.

3. Money

The money referred to as the main element for measuring defense capability is the defense budget, which is a measure or value of resources provided by the government to its armed forces. The budget provided by the government is used to cover the costs of managing or increasing its defense capabilities.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that there is a Maritime Defense Strategy Policy in the Indonesian Capital Region (IKN), namely;

1. Problem Formulation

In the Maritime Defense Strategy Policy in the Indonesian Capital Region (IKN), the problem formulation is the need for a defense system policy that can protect the Indonesian Capital (IKN) from various physical and non-physical threats. Given the location of the IKN which is in the strategic Indonesian Archipelago Sea Lane II (ALKI II) as a connecting route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it has a number of problems that have the potential to become threats.

1. Forecasting

Indonesia’s maritime defense strategy is based on the historical experience of Japan’s attack patterns in the Pacific War. The layered defense system implemented aims to prevent similar penetration from happening again. Layered defense requires the formation of three defense zones, namely a buffer zone that requires preemptive attack capabilities, a defense zone that requires counter-offensive capabilities, and a resistance zone as a protracted or guerrilla warfare area.

1. Policy Recommendations

With the relocation of the new National Capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan, the geographical character of the Indonesian National Capital has changed so far. Therefore, the development of the IKN necessitates the need for a transformation of the TNI’s strength because the center of gravity of the government has shifted from Java to Kalimantan. In addition, in order to protect the IKN, it is necessary to increase the capacity of existing military installations. Airfields located around the IKN need to be upgraded to ward off air attacks. The TNI AD’s strength is still centered in the western part of Indonesia. Jakarta is the center of gravity of Indonesia’s defense so that much of the Indonesian military capacity is currently placed on the island of Java.

1. Policy Result Assessment

In the appendix to Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning the IKN, another concept of a defense system in the IKN is introduced, namely a virtual maritime gate. The virtual maritime gate is a modern gate that utilizes gate-building elements in the form of a modern technological system with imaginary architecture to ensure that the movement of people, goods, or other instruments, such as ships both on the surface and under the sea can be quantified precisely. The gate utilizes technological elements such as sensors, underwater detectors, platform buoys, communication systems, and land data terminals. An information fusion center acts as the main clearinghouse for data collection and analysis along the 600-kilometer strait. The impact of this concept is that with an area of ​​around 7.9 million kilometers of sea, Indonesia does not have the ability to effectively patrol and continuously monitor all of its maritime waters. The discovery of Chinese-made unmanned underwater drones collecting oceanographic data in Indonesian waters over the past few years has highlighted the major gap in the country’s detection and monitoring capabilities. This system makes it easier to monitor the movement of warships and submarines transiting so close to the new capital city.

1. Policy Performance Evaluation

The relocation of the national capital is a policy that has a direct impact on Indonesia’s national resilience. The urgency contained in this policy is so high, as well as the potential impacts it causes, that the process of formulating it as a public policy needs to be formulated not only appropriately, but also comprehensively. Public participation as the main raw material for formulation is not only important, but also a necessity that cannot be abandoned. The national capital is one of the areas that requires high security. The defense situation of the national capital determines the smooth running of government so that a concept of national defense development is needed, both physically and non-physically. One aspect that needs important attention is the defense and security aspects of the new national capital. The strategic location of the IKN is inseparable from defense threats and security disturbances, whether carried out by state actors, non-state actors, and hybrids. The position of the IKN is directly adjacent to the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Lane (ALKI) II and the choke point or narrow point of the world.

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